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Abstract Europe has come to recognize that its
regions have a major role to play in achieving its
cohesion and competitiveness objectives. EU policies
and Structural Fund principles are therefore increas-
ingly geared towards enhancing regional capacities.
Regions across Europe are responding, with varying
results so far. The Randstad, in the Netherlands,
presents itself as a ‘far from best’ example. Despite
continued and serious attempts to strengthen capac-
ities and institutions, the region still lacks effective
governance. This paper explores the question why it
is next to impossible to establish a framework for
effective governance in the Randstad and distils some
lessons for other regions in Europe.
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Introduction
In its pursuit of competitiveness, dynamism, growth
and jobs (i.e. the Lisbon Strategy), Europe largely
depends upon its regions (Davies 1994; Williams
1996; Rivolin and Faludi 2005). This fact gained full
acceptance in the 2005 revision of the Strategy, which
not only narrowed the focus to the stimulation of
growth and the creation of jobs, but also identified the
need for increased ownership at all levels of govern-
ment as one of the key factors for the Strategy’s
success (European Commission 2005). The European
leaders recognized more clearly than before that while
the origins of many of the changes and challenges
affecting Europe are global, the impacts are mainly
regional and local, and that it is the regions of the EU
that have a major role to play in making the Strategy
work (Committee of the Regions (CoR) 2005, 2008).
According to the EU, ‘competitive regions’ are
regions that are able ‘to anticipate and successfully
adapt to internal and external economic and social
challenges’ (Huggins and Davies 2007, p. 1). This
ability is influenced by such factors as the quality of
the physical infrastructure and of human and social
capital, as well as by regions’ institutional and
organizing capacity. The capacity of public admin-
istrations and institutions is recognized as a factor
that may either undermine or enhance a region’s
ability to generate sustainable growth. This is one of
the reasons why EU Cohesion policy and Structural
Fund principles of late are increasingly geared
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towards enhancing regional capacities and ‘good
governance practices’ (Newman 2000).
During the past decade or so, the EU has introduced
and/or supported a variety of programmes and instru-
ments that are directly or indirectly aimed at enhancing
regional capacities and good governance practices
(Gualini 2006), for example through its Cohesion
policy and Territorial Cooperation objective (e.g.
INTERREG and INTERACT). Across Europe, regions
have taken up the challenge and have started (or
continued) to explore the possibilities for enhancing
institutional and governance capacities (Salet et al.
2003). Fine examples include the creation of the
Verband Region Stuttgart (‘Association of the Stutt-
gart Region’) and the Swedish experiments with
regional parliaments.
The Randstad—the heavily urbanized western part
of the Netherlands cornered by Amsterdam, The
Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht—is another, interest-
ing case in point. The region was the subject of a
comprehensive planning doctrine (Faludi and van der
Valk 1994), and attempts to strengthen its capacities
and institutions (Lambregts and Zonneveld 2004)
date from long before the Lisbon Strategy was drawn
up. At the end of the 1990s, with the tailwind
provided by ‘Europe’, conditions seemed ideal for the
region to smoothly establish itself as a regional actor
and become a prime example of how regions can help
to make ‘Lisbon’ work. Reality evolved in a different
way, however, and the above scenario has not
materialized. Despite continued and serious efforts,
the Randstad still lacks effective institutions and,
worse still, the prospects seem bleaker than ever. The
road towards effective regional governance in a
polycentric urban region, even in one that seemed to
have everything going for it, is apparently a very
bumpy one with plenty of pitfalls and diversions.
It is a good custom, not only among policy makers,
to aim to learn from ‘best practices’. However, in
many cases it is just as instructive to learn from
practices that are far from ‘best’. In this paper we try to
do the latter. The recent, rather troublesome history of
‘governance enhancement’ in the Randstad leads to
two questions, the answers to which may be of interest
to both actors operating in the Randstad area and to a
wider audience. The first question is: why is it virtually
impossible to establish a framework for effective
governance in the Randstad? What are the barriers and
why are they so hard to remove? The second, rather
obvious question concerns the lessons that can be
drawn from the Randstad experience for other regions
in Europe, especially the polycentric ones. These
questions perhaps do not qualify as ‘pioneering’, but
the answers may be of help to the many public
administrators, politicians and other actors who are
trying to enhance regional capacities across Europe.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section
‘‘Europe’s appeal to the regions’’ deals in more detail
with Europe’s perspective on the role of regions and
briefly discusses the various ways in which the EU is
trying to encourage the strengthening of governance
practices at the regional level. Section ‘‘One step
forward, two steps back: organizing institutional
capacity in the Randstad region around the turn of
the twenty-first century’’ describes how, over the past
decade or so, various actors in the Netherlands have
put great effort into increasing the organizing capac-
ity of the Randstad region, starting with the
foundation of the Deltametropolis Association at the
end of the 1990s. Next, in section ‘‘Barriers to
regional governance in the Randstad’’, we answer the
first of the above questions and try to discern the
factors that have effectively obstructed these efforts
so far. We investigate their origins and backgrounds
and provide an idea of their tenacity. In the fifth and
final section, we do not present a set of recommen-
dations on how the Randstad should proceed, but try
to distil some lessons for European regions that are
walking or intend to walk the same road.
Europe’s appeal to the regions
Regions are key to the European Union. Of all EU
regulations, some 75% are implemented at the
regional level (Evers 2006, p. 81), and in the 2000–
2006 and 2007–2013 programme periods more than a
third of the EU’s budget was/is allocated to the
reduction of development disparities between the
regions (European Communities 2004, 2008).
Through time, the EU has appealed to its regions
and their organizing capacity in two distinct but
complementary ways, namely by words and by
means. The former refers to the European discourse
on the role of regions in achieving the EU’s wider
objectives, the latter to the ways in which both the
preparation and the implementation of EU regional
programmes and instruments are organized.
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Regions in EU policy
EU papers and policy documents have time and
again stressed the crucial role of regions in achieving
cohesion and competitiveness. The Lisbon and
Gothenburg strategies are good examples (CoR
2005), as are the Third and the Fourth report on
Economic and Social Cohesion (European Commis-
sion 2004, 2007). European regional policy primarily
seeks to strengthen the economic, social and terri-
torial cohesion of the EU. At first, it chiefly did so by
redistributing resources in favour of the less well-off
territories. For a long time, convergence—that is, the
narrowing of developmental gaps between territo-
ries—was the main objective. Later, however, and
especially from the 1990s onward, regional compet-
itiveness and territorial cooperation emerged as
additional objectives. They received considerable
(if not absolute) status with the adoption of the
Lisbon agenda in 2000 and the Third Report on
Social and Economic Cohesion (European Commis-
sion 2004), respectively, and now figure prominently
in the 2007–2013 programme period (where they
appear on a par with the ‘Convergence’ objective,
the ‘Regional Competitiveness and Employment’
objective and the ‘European Territorial Cooperation’
objective). Especially the competitiveness objective
has engendered an increased interest in the utiliza-
tion of endogenous development potentials of
regions. Generating new resources has come to be
seen as just as important as redistributing existing
ones. Regions themselves have a key role to play in
achieving these objectives, and are therefore increas-
ingly recognized as ‘partners’ rather than ‘subjects’
(CoR 2005, 2008).
The European Spatial Development Perspective
(ESDP) is perhaps one of the EU documents that
most explicitly and elaborately appeals to regions’
organizing capacity. The ESDP—which was pub-
lished by the European Commission in 1999 after
years of consultation and rewriting—pursues a more
balanced and sustainable development of the Euro-
pean territory by means of three guiding principles,
namely: polycentric territorial development and a
new relationship between cities and their surround-
ing areas; equal accessibility to infrastructure and
knowledge; and the preservation of the Union’s
cultural and natural heritage. The concept of poly-
centric territorial development can be seen as an
effort to bridge what at first sight is an inherent gap
between the cohesion and the competitiveness
objective (Waterhout 2002). The concept is applied
at two spatial levels: that of the EU as a whole and
that of the region (sub-national, but including cross-
border). At the EU level, polycentric territorial
development refers to the strengthening and further
development of the more peripherally located urban
centres and regions. To achieve this, attention should
be focused not only on the large (capital) cities and
their regional hinterlands, but also on ‘polycentric’
urban regions. These are regions in which several
cities of medium size are located in relatively close
proximity, and where inter-city cooperation and
effective regional governance may help to unlock
latent competitive potential. Polycentric territorial
development at the EU level serves to counteract
‘further excessive economic and demographic con-
centration in the core area of the EU’ (i.e. the
‘Pentagon’) and to safeguard ‘the greater competi-
tiveness of the EU on a global scale’ (European
Commission 1999). At this level, both the conver-
gence and the competitiveness objective are clearly
at play. At the regional level, the emphasis is on the
competitiveness objective. Here, polycentric territo-
rial development is associated with cooperative
practices between neighbouring cities (‘city net-
works’ or ‘polycentric urban regions’) and the
development of complementary relationships, with
regard not only to economic functions, but also to
other urban functions, such as culture, education and
knowledge, and social infrastructure (Lambregts and
Zonneveld 2003). In addition, the ESDP advocates
that city clusters within individual Member States be
made the subject of integrated spatial development
strategies. Such regional strategies should aim to
overcome the disadvantages of intra-regional, inter-
city competition and instead build upon common
and/or composite strengths, and they could also offer
the framework for the shaping and reshaping of
urban-rural relationships and the coordination of
urban expansion plans (European Commission 1999;
Lambregts and Zonneveld 2003). The ESDP’s
steering philosophy as such can be seen as a plea
for improved horizontal and vertical integration in
spatial planning and for increased cooperation
among and between public and private actors (Faludi
and Waterhout 2002), and thus as a strong appeal to
regions’ organizing capacities.
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The programmes and instruments trail
The second way in which the EU encourages regions
to strengthen their organizing capacity is through its
regional programmes and instruments. Note that the
EU does not maintain any programmes that directly
support regional capacity building, not even under the
European Territorial Cooperation objective (which
focuses on cross-border, transnational and inter-
regional cooperation, and not so much on intra-
regional cooperation). Instead, regional capacity
building is encouraged in rather more subtle ways.
The programmes and instruments through which
European regional policy is delivered, are designed,
managed and fine-tuned in a collective and largely
decentralized process. In this process, European,
national, regional and local partners jointly settle impor-
tant issues such as programme priorities, eligibility
criteria, and application and monitoring procedures.
Regions (as well as other actors) have a clear interest in
effectively engaging in these important collective,
multilevel processes. After all, to be involved means to
exert influence (or at least have the possibility to do so)
and to be able to steer things in particular directions. To
be effectively involved as a region, however, requires a
certain degree of organization and purposiveness, as well
as a clear understanding of the region’s interests in
relation to the European programme at stake. For regions
that are represented by a single regional authority, this
should be a surmountable challenge; however, for
regions that lack such an authority, the same conditions
are almost certainly much more difficult to meet.
Similar qualities are then necessary to become a
beneficiary of these programmes and instruments.
Many programmes and instruments require local and
regional actors from the public and the private
domain to jointly apply for and, if the application is
granted, to jointly utilize the European support.
Together, these are strong incentives for regions to
organize themselves and respond (as the benefits may
be substantial), and in time many regions have come
to understand them well (Gualini 2006). In some
cases, they have even led to changes in Member
States’ appreciation of the regional level.
Responses
The EU Member States and their regions are clearly
influenced by these practices and susceptible to the
built-in incentives. Their responses, however, differ
(Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Gualini 2006).
Ireland, for example, has rearranged its regional
division in order to better attune to European subsidy
criteria. In Italy, Europeanization has been instru-
mental in facilitating the reconstruction of more
effective state-society relationships (Gualini 2003).
Denmark and Sweden, encouraged and supported by
the EU’s INTERREG II and IIIa initiatives, added a
new node to Europe’s polycentric system by boosting
the formerly peripheral cross-border Øresund region.
Also in the Netherlands, regions have felt the appeal
of Europe. Here, however, attempts to build capac-
ities have so far foundered on a variety of problems.
These problems are explored in the following two
sections, using the case of the Randstad as an
example.
One step forward, two steps back: organizing
institutional capacity in the Randstad region
around the turn of the twenty-first century
The Randstad was first conceived as a spatial entity—
or as a region—half a century ago in a report on the
development of the western part of the Netherlands
(Werkcommissie Westen des Lands 1958). This
report marked the start of a period in which the
desired form and role of the region would continue to
fascinate spatial planners of Dutch and other origins
alike (e.g. Burke 1966; Hall 1966). ‘The Randstad’
immediately became a cornerstone of the Dutch
planning edifice (Faludi and van der Valk 1994) and
it has maintained this position until today. Through-
out these years, the region’s fate has been contested,
at times fiercely, with especially the proponents and
opponents of a more metropolitan development
perspective crossing swords at regular intervals
(Lambregts and Zonneveld 2004). In the wake of
these skirmishes, the region’s institutional represen-
tation has been the subject of some serious debate,
especially during the past decade. In this section, in
order to pave the way for the more detailed analysis
of the factors that frustrate the strengthening of
regional capacities in the Randstad that follows in the
next section, we disclose this debate. Since the
planning history of the Randstad and the closely
related story on capacity building at the level of the
Randstad are well-documented (e.g. Lambregts and
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Zonneveld 2004; Zonneveld and Verwest 2005), and
since we aim to avoid repetition, we disregard the
earlier episodes and concentrate on the developments
of the past decade. This period coincides with the
intensification of Europe’s efforts to ‘mobilize’ the
regions outlined above, and also qualifies as a time in
which perhaps more energy was put into efforts to
strengthen capacities at the Randstad level than ever
before. Our analysis therefore starts in the second half
of the 1990s, a few years after the failure of the
‘Randstad International’ project that was still part of
the Fourth National Memorandum on Spatial Plan-
ning Extra (see Lambregts and Zonneveld 2004), and
right at the beginning of the preparatory period for
the country’s Fifth National Memorandum on Spatial
Planning. First, however, some basic features of the
region and its administrative context must be
outlined.
Some Randstad basics
Despite its importance as a planning concept, the
Randstad is not a formal constituent of the Dutch
polity. In the Netherlands, central government, the 12
provinces and the 443 municipalities (1 January
2008) constitute the three constitutional tiers of
elected government. The Randstad does not fit well
within this framework. Its approximately 7 million
inhabitants are divided between some 175 munici-
palities and four provinces or parts thereof. The
Randstad is not and has never been an administrative
unit nor has it been effectively governed by a regional
or ‘Randstad’ authority. The region does not have any
officially established boundaries. Yet, there exists a
rough understanding among people (including poli-
ticians and planners) in the Netherlands about which
parts of the country belong to the Randstad and which
do not.
The region is quintessentially polycentric (Lamb-
regts et al. 2006). It is dominated by four cities
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht) that
from a European perspective are medium-sized
(275,000–750,000 inhabitants). These are known in
the Netherlands as ‘the big four’ and are separated
from each other by the famous ‘Green Heart’ (Fig. 1).
Another seven or eight cities (i.e. municipalities) fall
in the range of 100,000–200,000 inhabitants, while
the rest are smaller or much smaller and are
predominantly of suburban or rural character. The
region as such accounts for almost 45% of the Dutch
population and for about 50% of the country’s jobs
and economic production (OECD 2007). Since all
these people and economic functions are concen-
trated on only about 16% of the Dutch land surface,
the Randstad is generally seen as the country’s
economic core and engine, and hence also as the
country’s trump card in the so-perceived European
inter-metropolitan competition for mobile resources
(Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment 1991, 2004). And although the region
over the past couple of years has somewhat lagged
behind European growth champions, such as Dublin
and Madrid, this perception is well-deserved as is
illustrated in Table 1.
Capacity building on the back
of the ‘Deltametropolis’
At the end of the 1990s, the Randstad’s assigned role in
the European inter-metropolitan competition, com-
bined with (a) dissatisfaction with the failure of
national spatial policy to contribute to the ‘metropol-
itan qualities’ of the Randstad, and (b) the notion that
preparatory work for a new National Memorandum on
Spatial Planning would soon begin (in the Dutch
context, such memoranda are important guides for the
allocation of spatial investments), incited the aldermen







Fig. 1 The Randstad
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Hague and Utrecht to let bygones be bygones and to
engage in yet another effort to join forces and secure
their common interests (Lambregts and Zonneveld
2004, pp. 311–312). The early 1990s had seen some
partially successful attempts to increase organizing
capacity at the local level (e.g. through annexations
and the promotion of mergers between municipalities,
the introduction of legal frameworks for inter-
municipal cooperation, and the half-hearted founda-
tion of stadsregio’s (‘city-regions’) around the
country’s seven major urban centres), but at the level
of the Randstad organizing capacity remained weak.
The aldermen opted for a change and in 1998 jointly
presented the Deltametropolis Declaration (Deltame-
tropool 1998), in which they revealed their vision of
the future spatial development of the Randstad region.
They claimed that the spheres of influence of the four
cities had started to overlap, that an increasing number
of planning issues in the Randstad area were tran-
scending the scale not only of the municipalities but
also of the provinces, and that, in combination with the
international ambitions, the time had come to join
forces, develop a common vision (i.e. the Deltame-
tropolis) and trade intra-regional competition for
cooperation (Frieling and van Iersel 2003). This
initiative soon resulted in the foundation of the
Vereniging Deltametropool (‘Deltametropolis Asso-
ciation’). This informal body served to enhance the
transformation of the ‘scattered’ Randstad into a more
coherent ‘Deltametropolis’ through the initiation of
research and design activities and by stimulating
professional exchange between Randstad-based
actors.
In the meantime, official consultation, policy
coordination and outward representation (also
towards the EU) was organized through a more
formal cooperative body called Regio Randstad
(‘Randstad Region’). This collaboration between the
four Randstad provinces (North Holland, South
Holland, Utrecht, Flevoland) had in fact existed since
1991, but new life was breathed into it and in 2002
the four largest cities and their respective city-regions
entered the agreement too (Storm 2006). This body
was grounded in law and its members had committed
themselves to the aim to strengthen the international
competitive position and to improve the quality of
life in the western part of the Netherlands (i.e. the
Randstad). However, decision making was based on
consensus and since the body lacked implementing
powers, the implementation of decisions was fully
dependent on the benevolence of the participants.
Political consultation between the Randstad Region
and central government was facilitated by the Best-
uurlijke Commissie Randstad (‘Administrative
Committee for the Randstad’). Here, national gov-
ernment and executive members of the Randstad
Region would meet several times a year to discuss,
for example, the central government’s spatial invest-
ments in the Randstad and the Randstad’s views on
national spatial policy.
The central government appeared to be receptive
to the vigour radiated by the united Randstad actors.
In the process leading up to the Fifth National Report
on Spatial Planning (released in 2001), it encouraged
groups of local and regional authorities to coordinate
their input and response to the Report at the supra-
provincial level. For that purpose, the country was
divided into four landsdelen (‘mega regions’), one of
which was the Region West (which included the
Randstad and was represented by the Administrative
Committee for the Randstad). These mega regions
coincided with the NUTS 1 level of the European
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, and
Table 1 Comparative performance of the Randstad on a
selection of Lisbon indicators (2006) (adapted from TNO 2007,
p. 8)
Indicator EU27 EU15 Netherlands Randstad
GDP per capita in
PPS (EU27 = 100)

















77.8 74.8 74.7 76.2
Gross domestic
expenditure on
R&D (% of GDP)




3.7 3.3 1.7 1.7
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their conception can be seen as a cautious response
from the Dutch government to the European efforts to
strengthen the role of regions (‘Europeanization’).
When the final draft of the Fifth Report appeared to
adopt much of the pro-Randstad/Deltametropolis
agenda and the ‘Deltametropolis’ was designated as
a ‘national urban network of international impor-
tance’ that deserved to be strengthened in various
ways (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment 2002), it seemed as though the cooper-
ating Randstad-based authorities would soon have
free play to further strengthen their capacities and
perhaps even aspire to the formation of a full-blown
Randstad government.
Changing winds, dwindling hopes
The Fifth Report, however, never acquired official
status due to the untimely fall of the government that
was responsible for its production and the subsequent
decision of the next government to produce a partly
new report. In this report—the National Spatial
Strategy (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and
the Environment et al. 2004)—the Deltametropolis
concept and its metropolitan focus were abandoned
and the old concept of ‘Randstad Holland’ reap-
peared, this time largely devoid of any serious
metropolitan ambitions. The new government, while
advocating a far-reaching decentralization policy,
appeared to be less convinced of the need to put the
level of the Randstad at centre stage. ‘Europe’ more
or less disappeared beneath the horizon (Modder
2004) and the policy focus shifted ‘back to basics’
and to the spatial scales for which concrete invest-
ment programmes could more easily be defined. In
practice, this meant that the Randstad Holland (the
Deltametropolis was no longer mentioned) was
divided into four programme areas (i.e. the north
wing and the south wing of the Randstad, the Utrecht
area and the Green Heart) and that concrete policies
and investment strategies were coordinated with the
authorities in each of the areas (rather than with the
Administrative Committee for the Randstad).
This of course was a major setback for those who
had rallied behind the idea of a strong and united
Deltametropolis. Faced with this new reality, local
and regional players had no choice other than to seek
a new balance between their more local and their
Randstad interests. Informal collaborative activities
that had already been initiated by local actors at the
level of the ‘wings’ (i.e. the North Wing Conference
and the South Wing Platform) were intensified. In
terms of their spatial scope, these networks corre-
sponded more closely with the actual functional
relationships on the ground (commuting patterns,
housing markets, etc.). Consequently, problems,
challenges and their possible responses were easier
to comprehend than were the more abstract chal-
lenges facing the Randstad, and conflicts of interest
were less manifest than they were at the Randstad
level. Soon, therefore, local actors started to appre-
ciate these networks at least as much as the Randstad
Region (in the north wing more than in the south
wing, admittedly), and felt that they were actually
yielding more results (helped of course by the
national government’s practice of funnelling spatial
investments this way).
Randstad united one more time…
Yet, the same local and regional actors who were
increasingly starting to find each other within their
respective ‘programme areas’ or ‘wings’, would still
not give up on the idea of strengthening capacities at
the Randstad level. In 2006, the ‘Holland 8’—that is,
the mayors of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague
and Utrecht, and the queen’s commissioners of the
four provinces—called for the creation of a central
Randstad authority that would be responsible for
instigating, coordinating and implementing spatial
policies at the scale of the Randstad. Even though the
members of the Holland 8 were not speaking for their
entire cities or provincial councils, they did make an
impression. Their lobby persuaded the Minister of
Interior Affairs to appoint a commission, headed by
the former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, to
investigate the issue and make recommendations. The
‘Kok’ Commission eventually concluded in support
of the Holland 8. According to the Commission, the
Randstad’s proposed role in the increasingly fierce
international and inter-metropolitan competition for
mobile resources, required that it would be able to
fend for itself, and far-reaching administrative reform
was also thought necessary to put an end to the
‘administrative crowdedness’ that was held responsi-
ble for the lack of verve and the agonizingly slow
decision-making procedures that were seen as pre-
venting the region from becoming more competitive
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(Fig. 2). The Commission recommended to introduce
some serious institutional reforms and to create a
single metropolitan government for the entire Rand-
stad that would take over responsibilities from the
existing provinces and city-regions, and put the
Randstad on the road to a bright and competitive
future (Commissie Versterking Randstad 2007).
…But again to no avail
In the spring of 2007, the national government chose
not to adopt the advice of the Kok Commission. It
was sustained in its decision by the outcomes of two
other important studies that had appeared around that
time. The first, a study by the National Spatial
Planning Agency, drew attention to the fact that
functional relationships at the scale of the Randstad
are still much weaker than at the scale of the
individual city-regions and the wings (Ruimtelijk
Planbureau 2006), and thus effectively undermined
any claims that the region could be seen (and should
be treated) as a single functional entity. And although
the second study—the OECD Territorial Review of
the Randstad Holland—acknowledged that in certain
ways the Randstad represented a relevant scale, it did
not consider the introduction of a Randstad authority
a necessity and instead favoured the strengthening of
the city-regions (OECD 2007).
The central government’s rejection of the institu-
tional reforms proposed by the Commission
constituted what may well have been a final blow
to the local and regional aspirations to strengthen
capacities at the level of the Randstad. The remainder
of the year saw a further intensification of coopera-
tion at the level of the wings (notably in the north
wing) and the discontinuation of the Randstad Region
collaboration (per 1 January 2008). Especially actors
in the north wing seemed to lose interest in the
‘Randstad project’. In a quite remarkable solo effort
at the end of 2007, they changed the name of their
region from the ‘north wing’ to ‘Amsterdam Metro-
politan Region’, thus clearly obstructing any further
attempts to promote the Randstad as the one and only
Dutch metropolis. This step has made the prospects
of strengthening institutional and governance capac-
ities at the level of the Randstad appear bleaker than
ever, while only 10 years ago they looked distinc-
tively rosy. In the following section, we delve deeper
into the reasons why building institutional capacity at
the Randstad level is such a difficult project.
Barriers to regional governance in the Randstad
Recent attempts to organize institutional capacity at
the scale of the Randstad have not had the desired
effects. The barriers that so effectively hamper any
amendment of the constitutional structure that regu-
lates intergovernmental relations in the Netherlands
successfully withstood the Deltametropolis initiative,
the local and regional authorities united in the
Randstad Region and ‘Holland 8’, and the Kok
Commission. Worse still, it appeared to be just as
difficult for local and regional actors to establish
effective and lasting informal cooperative arrange-
ments within this constitutional structure. The
dissolution of the Randstad Region as of 1 January
2008 tells its own story.
Why has meaningful cooperation at the level of the
Randstad failed to materialize? Why is it that the
promise of being able to unlock the regional potential
through good regional governance has not persuaded
actors at all levels to do their utmost? Even though
the course of events is ongoing and not all intricacies
can be taken into account, some possible explanations
can be pointed at. The majority of these can be
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Fig. 2 Partial and schematic overview of administrative actors
in the Randstad area (not shown, for example, are the ca. 150
municipalities that have a say in planning matters as well)
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governmental competition, those related to the ratio-
nale behind the project, and those related to
leadership and control.
Competing governments
Attempts to strengthen institutions at a particular
level often lead to a change in the balance of power
both within and between government tiers. In such
cases, resistance is to be expected from those who
fear a loss of power. This applies to the Dutch context
too. At least three forms of inter-governmental
competition for power are likely to have posed
a barrier to institutional capacity building at the
level of the Randstad, namely competition among
local authorities within the Randstad, competition
between the Randstad and other regions within the
Netherlands, and competition between the Randstad
and the national government.
As noted, the Randstad is quintessentially poly-
centric. A substantial number of cities within the area
compete with each other for the central government’s
investments. In an international comparative perspec-
tive, Dutch municipalities are financially very
dependent on the national government. Only 20%
of a municipality’s income is raised within the
municipality, the remainder comes from the national
government, either as a lump sum (35%) or as ring-
fenced money to be spent in delegated authority
(45%). Attracting additional investments from the
national government for large-scale infrastructure or
economic development projects is high on all
municipal agendas and places municipalities into a
competitive relationship vis-a`-vis each other. This
centralized, top-down financing system clearly
favours vertical relations over inter-municipal or
inter-regional horizontal relations (Janssen-Jansen
2004). Next to this, cities also compete for incoming
private investments (and the resulting jobs) and the
more affluent segments of the population. Although,
and perhaps even because municipalities do not
benefit directly from the success of local businesses
or from property taxes, they are very eager to receive
revenues from the land servicing plans. This makes
that realizing offices and expensive housing is much
more profitable for municipalities than investing in
social housing. While the competition resulting from
these conditions also affects smaller municipalities, it
is particularly strong among the four larger cities. It is
safe to assume therefore that these cities in their
attempts to further the Deltametropolis initiative and,
as of 2002, the Randstad Region continuously
balanced their cooperative efforts against their indi-
vidual interests. This of course held the main actors
back from engaging in full and put restraints on what
cooperation could have achieved anyway. The
absence of accepted hierarchies between the major
cities might make intra-regional competition a more
serious concern in a polycentric region such as the
Randstad compared to monocentric regions, and it
may also partly explain why internal competition at
lower geographical scales within the Randstad (i.e.
the wings and the city-regions) is less of a barrier to
cooperation. Here, hierarchical (and power) relation-
ships are usually clear and not that much contested,
making it relatively easier for everyone to construc-
tively rally around a joint objective. Adding weight to
this factor in the Randstad context is the fact that not
all cities and city-regions depended to the same
degree on the success of the Randstad project. To
strengthen the international competitiveness of the
region and its constituent cities was one of the main
rationalities underlying the cooperative efforts, but it
gradually became increasingly clear that Amsterdam
and the north wing, supported by strong economic
growth, had managed to achieve international com-
petitiveness on their own. This made it particularly
easy for Amsterdam to be in two minds about the
Randstad project and turned cooperation in the North
Wing Conference into a very interesting alternative.
Institutional capacity building at the level of the
Randstad suffered not only from internal competition,
but also from power struggles between the Randstad
and the rest of the Netherlands. In this case, the ‘rest
of the Netherlands’ was/is represented by the three
other landsdelen (mega regions) that produced input
to the Fifth Memorandum on Spatial Planning and the
National Spatial Strategy (see section ‘‘One step
forward, two steps back: organizing institutional
capacity in the Randstad region around the turn of
the twenty-first century’’), and by the national
government. The Netherlands has a strong tradition
of redistributing wealth and public resources equally
across the country, and regions that claim to deserve
more than the others can expect serious opposition. In
the Fifth Memorandum on Spatial Planning, the
national government seemed to be willing to break
with this tradition, as it went along with the idea to
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favour the Randstad (then labelled Deltametropolis;
see section ‘‘One step forward, two steps back:
organizing institutional capacity in the Randstad
region around the turn of the twenty-first century’’)
over the rest of the country to a considerable degree.
However, the balance was soon restored (and the
Randstad’s ambitions downplayed) with the arrival of
a new national government that appeared to be more
open to the competing claims of the other regions.
By refusing to grant the Randstad the resources
and the institutional capacities the latter had repeat-
edly argued for, the national government most
probably did not only intend to serve the interests
of the other regions. Just as the provinces had
rightfully feared the erosive effects of the creation of
city-regions, the national government had (and still
has) reasons to worry about the consequences of a
Randstad that would be capable of largely fending for
itself. A possible Randstad authority would govern
almost half of the Dutch population and its economy,
and would seriously undermine the position of the
national government (depending on the authority’s
given powers, of course). It is because of this and
other factors that the national government has
generally been favourably disposed towards the more
informal and voluntarily cooperative arrangements
organized at the Randstad level, but has never
endorsed any constitutional reform.
Abstract and contested rationale
The two most frequently used arguments in support
of strengthening institutional capacities at the level of
the Randstad are: (a) the Randstad requires governing
capacity in order to be able to fend for itself in the
global inter-metropolitan competition for mobile
resources (the individual cities are considered too
small to play a role at this level), and (b) the
establishment of a Randstad authority that replaces
the plethora of sub-regional and sectoral cooperative
arrangements and governmental platforms could help
to tackle the problem of ‘administrative crowdedness’
and increase the speed and effectiveness of regional
policy making. While these arguments make sense,
they are also somewhat problematic. The interna-
tional competition argument has rhetorical power, but
it is also rather abstract. Its users have always had
trouble explaining how exactly the establishment of a
Randstad authority would eventually lead to greater
competitiveness and international success for the
region. The problem with the second argument is that
it is somewhat speculative (success is not guaranteed)
and disregards some thorny details. Filling the
governance deficit at the Randstad level by substitu-
tion is likely to create governance deficits at lower
levels (possibly even of a more serious nature), while
leaving out the substitution objective renders the
argument internally inconsistent.
Proponents of strengthening institutional capacity
at the Randstad level have not been able to convince
their opponents of the idea that the Randstad
represents the scale at which important parts of
social and economic life are organized and thus
should be equipped with certain policy-making
capacities. Functional relationships and interdepen-
dencies at the Randstad level do exist (Lambregts
2008), but they are less visible and less voluminous
than the relationships defined at the scale of the city-
regions and the wings (Ruimtelijk Planbureau 2006).
For many people, the latter coincide with their daily
activity space and for many planners this automati-
cally means that governance should be organized at
these levels.
The same proponents have also more or less failed
to convincingly identify urgent spatial challenges that
necessarily require to be addressed at the Randstad
level. In theory, such challenges can be defined
irrespective of existing social and economic func-
tional relationships (e.g. in anticipation of a future
threat, such as climate change). Although they have
been introduced to the Randstad debate (e.g. the
water retention and transportation challenges), again
it could not be argued clearly enough that only a
Randstad authority could address such issues.
Together, these weaknesses—namely the inability
to define issues that clearly and irrefutably call for a
Randstad approach/solution, the inability to define
consequential interdependencies and interrelation-
ships that justify a Randstad approach, and the
abstract rather than concrete nature of the arguments
used—have undermined the position of the Randstad
advocates, and have also rendered the definition of
one or more typical, symbolic ‘Randstad’ projects too
large a challenge. Candidate projects (e.g. the con-
version of the Green Heart into a ‘metropolitan park’
and the construction of a circular high-speed transit
system, the Rondje Randstad) never gained enough
support to get off the ground. ‘Europe’ as an
54 GeoJournal (2008) 72:45–57
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argument was always there in the background, but
never carried enough weight to tip the scales.
Leadership and control
Political leadership is a crucial condition for estab-
lishing and maintaining regional governance
(Sotarauta 2005). Without compelling arguments,
however, political leaders are less likely to fully back
a high-risk project. It is no surprise, then, that in the
case of institution building for the Randstad, political
leaders through time have been reluctant to unam-
biguously associate themselves with the project. The
position of the various national governments towards
the Randstad has mostly been lacklustre, and there
has been only limited enthusiasm among local and
regional politicians. Lip service was in many cases
easily given, but no bold leaders arose.
Following the dissolution of the Randstad Region,
the initiative once again lies with the national
government. It has made one of its ministers respon-
sible for the coordination and realization of projects
within the Randstad area (although not all can be
considered Randstad projects) and for the drafting of
a long-term development strategy (in cooperation
with local and regional stakeholders). This seems to
be a continuation of the old and safe middle course,
in which drastic institutional changes are not part of
the script.
The Randstad experience: concluding remarks
There are a few lessons to be drawn from the
Randstad experience—especially because it is not the
only region in Europe that has been struggling with
challenges related to institutional capacity building in
the past years, and because Europe’s continued
appeal to the regions has started to take effect across
Europe. With the addition of the competitiveness
objective to the convergence objective, regions have
come to be increasingly seen by the EU as partners in
the policy delivery process and are addressed as such.
They are invited to work on their competitive
strengths, to help generate new resources and to
contribute to the development of a more polycentric
and balanced European territory. Regional adminis-
trations are encouraged by words and by subtle means
to strengthen their capacities so as to improve their
ability to anticipate and adapt, and to generate
sustainable growth.
Yet the discussion on the recent attempts by
authorities in the Randstad region to strengthen
institutional capacity presented in this paper makes
it clear that the path towards effective governance for
competitive regions is not always strewn with roses.
Whereas such regions as Øresund and Stuttgart are
making good headway and, as such, are contributing
to the effectuation of European convergence and
competitiveness objectives, similar efforts in the
Randstad over the past ten years have largely been
to no avail. The case of the Randstad shows how
delicate and difficult processes of institutional capac-
ity building can be. Existing administrative structures
and the balance of power they represent can be very
persistent, and it may require extraordinary and very
dedicated agency to alter them. Key actors’ loyalties
may be multivocal and hard to win. The quality of the
rationale for regionalization and institutional reform
matters too. Strong arguments are needed to gain
support for regional projects that in turn may function
as the driving force for further developments; in
addition, such arguments increase the likelihood that
politicians are willing to take the lead and make a
difference. In the Randstad, inter-governmental com-
petition (at no less than three levels), ambiguous
loyalties, unconvincing reasoning and the concomi-
tant lack of leadership all worked against institutional
capacity building at the level of the Randstad. They
could not be counteracted by ‘Europe’ and its
arguments and incentives for strong regions.
The barriers to institutional capacity building dis-
tinguished above are not unique to the Randstad. They
play their roles in other regions as well, albeit perhaps
in different combinations and with different strength.
Some of them—such as horizontal inter-governmental
competition and the occurrence of multivocal loyal-
ties—may be more prevalent in polycentric urban
regions than in their ‘monocentric’ counterparts (i.e.
regions that are characterized by more hierarchically
organized power relationships). While the Randstad
experience does not provide a map for other regions to
follow, it does point at a number of pitfalls that other
regions may wish to avoid.
There is, however, a reassuring side to the
Randstad story, especially when viewed from a
European policy perspective. Apparently, strong
economic performance (not a bad measure of
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competitiveness) does not necessarily require strong
regional institutions. Despite its faltering organizing
capacities, the Randstad scores way above average on
many of the Lisbon indicators. Admittedly, this
leaves untouched the question whether the Rand-
stad’s performance would have been better by now
had the efforts to build capacity on the back of the
Deltametropolis around the turn of the century really
produced results, as well as the question whether the
informal but more productive cooperation taking
place in what is now the Amsterdam Metropolitan
Area is responsible for or is a product of the
economic boom this area is experiencing. These are
excellent issues for further research.
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